Abstract. NTRU is a fast public key cryptosystem presented in 1996 by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman of Brown University. It operates in the ring of polynomials Z[X]/(X N − 1), where the domain parameter N largely determines the security of the system. Although N is typically chosen to be prime, Silverman proposes taking N to be a power of two to enable the use of Fast Fourier Transforms. We break this scheme for the specified parameters by reducing lattices of manageably small dimension to recover partial information about the private key. We then use this partial information to recover partial information about the message or to recover the private key in its entirety.
Introduction
NTRU is a fast public key cryptosystem that operates in the ring of truncated polynomials given by Z[X]/(X N −1), where the domain parameter N largely determines the security of the system. Typically N is chosen to be a prime number (not for security reasons, but because having N prime maximizes the probability that the private key has an inverse with respect to a specified modulus [?] ). Recently, however, Silverman has proposed taking N to be a power of two to allow the use of Fast Fourier Transforms when computing the convolution product of elements in the ring [?] .
In this paper, we present lattice-based attacks that are especially effective when N is composite. We show how to use low-dimensional lattices to find a folded version of the private key, where the folded private key has d coefficients with d dividing N . This folded private key can be used either to obtain a folding of the plaintext message, or as partial information to help us recover the entire private key. Using this attack, we were able to recover entire private keys for the NTRU-256 scheme proposed by Silverman in an average of about 3 minutes.
inverse of a polynomial f ∈ Z q [X]/(X n − 1) is denoted by f −1 q . A polynomial may be described as a row vector:
Concatenation of f and g is denoted by (f, g). The convolution f * g of two vectors is analogous to ordinary polynomial multiplication over Z[X]/(X n − 1):
When d divides n, the d-dimensional folded version of f is defined by:
In algebraic terms, f (d) may be described as the image of f under the canonical mapping from Z[X]/(X n − 1) to Z[X]/(X d − 1). The ith term of f (d) will be denoted f (d),i . The circulant matrix associated with f is given by F , where:
F i will denote the ith row vector of F . F (d) will denote the circulant associated with f (d) , and F (d),i will denote its ith row vector. I (d) will refer to the d-dimensional identity matrix.
The NTRU Cryptosystem
Public Parameters The basic objects of the NTRU Cryptosystem are polynomials from the ring Z[X]/(X N − 1), where N is a public parameter. Also public are two moduli, p and q, with g.c.d.(p, q) = 1 and p q. For example, (N , p, q) = (167, 3, 128) has been proposed as a high security parameter set [?] . Additional public parameters include S f , S g , S m , and S φ , which describe the space of allowable polynomials for private keys f and g, the plaintext message m, and a random polynomial φ that the sender uses in encrypting the message. These spaces are designed to limit f , g, m, and φ to vectors that have short Euclidean length (in practice, less than √ N ) and that typically are also very short in the l ∞ -norm -i.e., the magnitudes of the individual coefficients are typically very small in relation to q. For example, in NTRU-167, S f might limit f to those polynomials having exactly 61 coefficients equal to 1, 60 coefficients equal to -1, and 46 coefficients equal to 0 [?] . S m always restricts the coefficients of m to Z p .
Key creation Choose random f ∈ S f and g ∈ S g . Compute f −1 q and publish the polynomial
as the public key. Both f and g are private, with f serving as the private key.
Encryption Choose random φ in S φ and compute the ciphertext:
where the second equality follows from the definition of h. Assuming S f , S m , S φ , and S g are chosen wisely, such that the coefficients of f , m, φ, and g are very small in relation to q, then, with high probability, we get
which is to say that reduction modulo q has no effect. This is because the coefficients of f * m + pφ * g, with high probability, already lie in (− q 2 , q 2 ] before reduction modulo q. Possessing the unreduced value of f * m + pφ * g, we can compute
and then
Previous Lattice Attacks on NTRU
Lattice attacks on NTRU (including our attack) have focused primarily on the following "key recovery" problem: find the private key f using only the public key h and public information about how f and g are chosen (S f and S g ).
1 By the definition of h, we know that f * h = g (mod q), but this information alone is clearly insufficient to recover f . Indeed, the set of pairs u, v ∈ Z N that satisfy u * h = v (mod q) is an additive abelian group of infinite cardinality. Even if we limit ourselves to pairs u, v ∈ Z N q , we are still left with q N distinct (u, v) pairs corresponding to the q N distinct values that u can assume. How do we find the pair (f, g) from among these q N possibilities? We know that, to enable error-free decoding, the coefficient vectors of f and g each have short Euclidean length (less than √ N in current NTRU implementations). They are considerably shorter than the typical "random" N -dimensional vector with coefficients in Z q , which has an expected length of more than
Also, one can show that it is extremely unlikely that the abelian group generated by a "randomly" chosen h has a (u, v) pair as short as (f, g). 2 These facts may lead us to hypothesize that (f, g) is, in fact, the shortest nonzero vector (u, v) ∈ Z 2N such that u * h = v (mod q). If this hypothesis is true, and if we can find an efficient way to find the shortest vector belonging to the group of (u, v) pairs, we can recover the private key. This provides the motivation for representing the group of (u, v) pairs as a "lattice," and then using "lattice basis reduction."
A "lattice" is a discrete additive subgroup of R n . For example, Z n is a lattice. Also, the set of (u, v) pairs is a lattice, being an additive subgroup of Z 2N . An equivalent, but more concrete, definition is that a lattice L consists of all integer linear combinations of some set of m linearly independent vectors
Here, m is the "dimension" of L, and B is called a "basis" of L. The basis B can be compactly represented by an m × n matrix where the ith row is the "basis vector" b i , in which case L consists of the vectors that can be expressed as integer linear combinations of the rows of B. Bases for a lattice are not unique, but are related by unimodular transformations -i.e., if U is an integral m × m matrix with determinant ±1, then U B is an equally valid basis for L. Typically, the goal of "lattice basis reduction" is to find a basis B for L in which the basis vectors are as short as possible (usually in the Euclidean sense), with the basis vector b 0 being the shortest nonzero vector in the entire lattice (allowing for possible ties).
Coppersmith and Shamir [?] give us the following explicit basis for the lattice of (u, v) pairs (recall that H denotes the circulant matrix corresponding to the public key h):
To see that any pair (u, v) ∈ Z 2N for which u * h = v (mod q) is contained in the lattice generated by L CS , let a ∈ Z N be such that u * h = v + qa. Then, if we left-multiply L CS by (u, −a), we obtain (u, v). As a consequence, the private key pair (f, g) is an integer linear combination of the rows of L CS . If (f, g) is actually the shortest vector in the generated lattice, as we have reason to believe, 3 then an "SVP-oracle" -a magical device which gives us the answer to the "shortest vector problem" in a reasonable (polynomial) amount of time -would give us the private key when given L CS as input.
For the attacker, the problem is that actual lattice basis reduction algorithms, such as LLL and its variants, do not behave like SVP-oracles. The original LLL algorithm terminates in time polynomial in the dimension n of the lattice, but it is only guaranteed to find a vector that is no more than 2 (n−1)/2 times -2 (2N −1)/2 times, in the case of L CS -as long as the shortest vector. Obviously, such an algorithm is useless to us, considering that it is trivial to find vectors only about q 4 times as long as (f, g), as suggested above, and even these are far too long to be useful for decryption. Variants of LLL exist that find shorter vectors, but they naturally have greater time-complexity. In particular, Schnorr defines a family of LLL-variants whose performances depend on a parameter called the "blocksize." Little is known about the average-case complexity of these variants, but it appears, based on numerous experiments by the authors of NTRU using Shoup's NTL library [?] , that the time necessary to find (f, g) in the lattice grows at least exponentially in N (because the block size required for LLL to find (f, 
Cryptanalysis of NTRU-Composite
The problem with previous lattice-based attacks is that the dimension of the lattices involved is too high, given that the running time of LLL to return the target vector of these lattices is empirically exponential in the lattice dimension. Ideally, we would like to construct much smaller (and more easily reduceable) lattices whose shortest vectors contain at least some useful cryptanalytic information. We can do this if N is composite. Theorem 1. Let N be composite, and d be a nontrivial divisor. The mapping
is a ring homomorphism.
Although this is a basic algebraic result, arising from the fact that (X d − 1) divides (X N −1) when d divides N , we prove multiplication in a concrete fashion.
Proof.
This gives us
, which is what we wanted.
A Smaller Version of L CS
With the equation
This lattice contains the vector ( d) , each of which is a summation of N/d coefficients of f and g respectively, are also small. Assuming (
we can find it using lattice reduction. We can then recover significant partial information about the private key by reducing a lattice whose dimension is only a fraction of the dimension of the lattice generated by L CS .
In Appendix ??, we give a tight upper bound on the length of (
) and show that, assuming f and g are "random" in a specified way, the expected length of (f (d) , g (d) ) is equal to the length of (f, g) (once certain modifications are made to these vectors). This leads us to conclude that, at least when
) is almost certainly the shortest vector in L (d) for the same reasons that (f, g) is almost certainly the shortest vector in L CS .
Remark: In the discussion above, we have limited our focus to homomorphisms of the form θ :
and the folded lattices derived therefrom, but this need not be the case. More generally, we could consider homomorphisms of the form α :
given by α(f ) = f + < s(X), q >, where s(X)t(X) = (X N − 1) (mod q) for some t(X). However, such homomorphisms appear to be useful only when (α(f ), α(g)) is a short vector that can be found using lattice basis reduction, and (α(f ), α(g)) is always short only if s(X) is an extremely short vector, preferably with a minimum of high degree coefficients (e.g., (X d − 1)). Useful alternative homomorphisms therefore appear to be rare.
Message Attacks
Once we find f (d) , we can make immediate use of it to recover the folded plaintext. Since folding is a ring homomorphism, we get:
We then proceed through the steps of decryption in the usual way until we obtain m (d) . If N/d = 2, for example, knowing m (d) is tantamount to knowing m i +m i+d for 0 ≤ i < d, where the m i are coefficients from the original plaintext. This could be useful information.
However, folding entails an increased likelihood of decryption errors, since the expected magnitudes of the coefficients of
are larger than those of f * m + pφ * g by a factor of N/d. So, this message attack appears to be practical only for very small values of N/d.
Key Recovery Attacks
Alternatively, we can use f (d) to help us recover f . The basic concept behind this attack is the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which tells us, for example, that f is completely determined by the values of f (mod
Instead of using the lattice corresponding to f (mod (X N − 1)/(X d − 1)), however, we use a different lattice with a shorter target vector.
Supposing, for example, that N/d = 2, we obtain linear equations of the form
Recall that in the lattice generated by L CS , the target vector
where (I i , H i ) denotes the concatenation of the ith rows of the identity matrix and the circulant H. Using the dependencies in f , we obtain
Notice that we already know all of the terms in the second summation; let (s, t) be this known vector. If we denote by u the d-dimensional vector with coefficients equal to the first d coefficients of f , then (u, g) is in the following
where H (N ),i − H (N ),i+d is a d × N matrix formed by pairing rows, and the top third of the lattice consists only of a single row. Now, if we wish, we may discard the last d columns, obtaining a (2d + 1) × (2d) lattice with target vector (u, v), where v consists of the first d coefficients of g. Clearly, (u, v) is a short vector, most likely the shortest vector in this lattice. Once we obtain (u, v), this information can be combined with (f (d) , g (d) ) to completely recover (f, g). We thereby obtain the private key without ever having to reduce a 2N -dimensional lattice. When N/d > 2, we can decrease the dimension of L CS by about 2d in a similar fashion. This 2d reduction in lattice dimension should reduce LLL's running time by a factor exponential in 2d.
NTRU-256
Silverman [?] proposes choosing N to be a power of 2, because then convolution products can be computed rapidly using Fast Fourier Transforms. In particular, he suggests (N , p, q) = (256, 2, 127) as an advantageous choice of parameters. We found that an NTRU-256 private key can be recovered in about 3 minutes using the folding technique described above.
In our experiments, we used a three-staged approach in recovering the private key. First, we recovered (f (64) , g (64) ) by reducing the lattice generated by L (64) -a 128-dimensional matrix with H (64) in upper right quadrant. Second, we recovered (f (128) , g (128) ) by reducing the 129 × 128 lattice constructed as described above. Finally, we took advantage of the modulo p structure of the private keys to create an over-defined system of linear equations. For example, upon computing that f (128),i = 0, we know that
Similarly, f (128),i = 2 implies f i = f i+128 = 1. When p = 2, this trick most likely results in more than half of g's coefficients being known, and less than half of f 's coefficients being unknown, so that we may solve for the unknown coefficients in f . We thereby recover the entire private key (f, g) using lattices one-fourth the size of L CS .
Since the S f and S g parameters were not specified for NTRU-(256,2,127), we used those for NTRU-(263,2,127) -specifically, f and g both have 35 1's, the rest 0's [?] . Using the NTL's implementation of LLL with a block size of 10 for both reductions, the 3 stages took an average of 40, 43 and 3 seconds, respectively.
6 Out of 20 trials, the correct key was recovered every time. We also tested the case when f has 75 1's and g has 65 1's, which is more challenging cryptanalytically, both in terms of the lattice reduction (since the target vector is longer) and the linear system (since there are more equations to solve). To avoid errors, the block size for the second reduction was increased to 12. The three stages took an average of 84, 94 and 12 seconds, respectively. Out of 10 trials, the correct key was recovered 9 times.
Some gimmicks were required to pick the target vector from among other short, but useless, vectors. For example, in the first reduction, we searched for rather than (f ± is the vector consisting of alternating 1's and -1's. We simply skipped over these trivial vectors manually, continuing on to the next vector in the lattice until the desired nontrivial one was obtained. This process certainly could have been automated.
Remarks on NTRU-Prime
As we noted in the introduction, the domain parameter N is typically chosen to be prime not, apparently, for security reasons, but because it maximizes the probability that a randomly chosen private key f has inverses modulo q and p, these inverses being necessary for public key generation and decryption, respectively [?] . In terms of security, NTRU's typical use of a prime domain parameter appears to be merely fortuitous.
Folding does not work when N is prime -e.g.,
However, we can say that if f * h = g, and if h has a period of c in the sense that h i = h i+c for 0 = i < N − c, then the first N coefficients of g = (f, 0) * h (where (f, 0) is f followed by c zeros and h is h followed by the c coefficients of h's period) are precisely the N coefficients of g. (Proof omitted.) For example, suppose N = 263 and h has a period of 37 -i.e., h 0 = h 37 , . . . , h 225 = h 262 . Then, we obtain (f, 0) by appending 37 zeros to f and obtain the last c coefficients of h by the relations h 263 = h 226 , . . . , h 289 = h 262 . This will give us (f, 0) * h = (g, w), where the coefficients of w are not necessarily small. Since (f, 0), h and (g, w) have dimension 263 + 37 = 300, a composite number, we can fold them to dimension, say, 100, obtaining the relation (f, 0) (100) * h (100) = (g, w) (100) . All of the coefficients of (f, 0) (100) will be small, and 100 -37 = 63 of the coefficients of (g, w) (100) will be small, so we can construct a lattice of dimension 163 that may give us partial information about f and g. Although this approach works well in the rare case that h has a small period, it does not appear to lead to an attack against NTRU-prime that works in general.
Circulant lattices have a rather interesting property -namely, given an ndimensional lattice generated by circulant matrix C, one can construct an distinct coefficients, so that the rows of C can be paired together. This property of circulant lattices does not appear to allow one to cut the dimension of L CS (a block -circulant lattice) in half, unless h is a palindrome.
Summary and Conclusion
We have shown that choosing N to be a composite number, especially one with a small factor, significantly reduces the security of the NTRU cryptosystem. Also, we have shown that it is possible to recover entire NTRU private keys using lattices of much smaller dimension than was previously thought. To avoid the presented attacks, N should be chosen to be prime, or to have only large nontrivial factors.
